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Existence in a Shambles: 
Examining the Curious Case of Depersonalization Disorder 
 One night during my adolescence will be perpetually engrained in my 
memory. The evening had passed and I found myself lying in bed, wide-eyed and 
full of energy, even as the clock crept steadily toward the wee hours of the night. 
As I basked in the silent darkness, my mind wandered from the petty topics of the 
day to the deeper existential questions of life. “Who am I?” I asked myself. “Why 
am I here? Is any of this real?” Suddenly, as my gaze drifted around the room, the 
objects in my field of vision began to blur. The desk to my left slowly grew in 
size and the chair to my right seemed to shift its shape. I was completely 
perplexed. In a rush of panic, I quickly sat up, closed my eyes, and forced myself 
back to reality. As I opened my eyes, the world was as it was just minutes before. 
Could this experience have been merely a dream? It is impossible to say. 
Whatever the nature of the experience had been, it had given rise to very real 
feelings of depersonalization and derealization, two all too common but seldom 
recognized psychological phenomena that form the basis of the psychopathology 
known as depersonalization disorder. In the following analysis, I intend to 
examine this disorder in terms of clinical criteria for diagnosis, the conceptual 
understanding of depersonalization and derealization, the prevalence of these 
phenomena and their pathological form, and the grounding of these phenomena in 
various traumatic and biological factors. 
 The DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) outlines 
several criteria for the diagnosis of depersonalization disorder. First, for the 
diagnosis to be made, an individual must be suffering from persistent and 
recurring depersonalization and/or derealization symptoms. Furthermore, these 
symptoms must cause marked distress and/or impairment in normal functioning. 
Also, the symptoms previously described must not occur exclusively in the 
context of another general medical or psychiatric condition. Finally, and most 
importantly, the individual must retain intact reality testing. In other words, the 
individual does not believe that he, she, or the external world is literally unreal. 
Rather, the individual feels as if he, she, or the external world is unreal. 
Therefore, it cannot be said that a genuine sufferer of depersonalization disorder 
is psychotic. However, as previously mentioned, it is common that those 
experiencing depersonalization and/or derealization symptoms feel like they are 
becoming psychotic. Upon viewing these criteria for diagnosis, a singular 
question comes to mind: How can depersonalization and derealization symptoms 
be characterized? 
Depersonalization and derealization, in the context of depersonalization 
disorder, can be seen as essentially manifestations of psychological dissociation in 
which an individual experiences a subjective feeling of estrangement, detachment, 
and/or disconnection from the self (Simeon & Abugel, 2006). Depersonalization 
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and derealization symptoms reflect a sense of unreality with either the self or the 
outside world. The term “unreal” can be quite troublesome unless adequately 
defined. Radovic and Radovic (2002) formulated three distinct definitions of 
unreality. First, one might imagine that, in the case of imaginary friends for 
example, certain things are unreal in the sense of not existing at all. However, for 
something to be unreal it does not necessarily have to lack existence entirely. 
Unreality can take the form of artificiality, as in the case of children’s toys. For 
example, a child’s stuffed elephant can be considered unreal in the sense that it is 
merely a substitute or representative of the real thing. Finally, something may be 
considered unreal in the sense that it is atypical or untrue. This final definition 
seems to represent the quintessence of unreality as experienced in 
depersonalization and derealization. Aside from this core experience of unreality, 
various other symptoms are commonly seen in depersonalization and 
derealization as well as the more pathological depersonalization disorder. 
 First and foremost, emotional numbing is by far the most common 
symptom of depersonalization disorder (Simeon & Abugel, 2006). As will be 
subsequently examined, numerous physiological antecedents to this 
hypoemotionality have been discovered. Additionally, the broad spectrum of 
depersonalization symptomatology includes the following: the sensation of being 
an outside observer of oneself, feeling like an automaton or a machine (in other 
words, feeling as if one is not in control of one’s actions), feeling as if life is 
being experienced merely as a dream or a movie, changes in the subjective 
experiencing of time and/or space, a heightened sense of self-observation (leading 
to obsessions and ruminations), the inability to focus and/or sustain attention, and 
finally an overall sense of mind emptiness (Simeon & Abugel, 2006). As seen 
earlier, depersonalization and derealization often go hand in hand. But what 
exactly is derealization? Derealization, unlike depersonalization, involves the 
observable world outside of the self and can be described as the sense that the 
world and objects (oftentimes including other people) within it seem strange or 
unreal. Harkening back to my personal experience of derealization, objects can 
inexplicably appear to change in size and shape. Macropsia – objects appearing to 
enlarge – and micropsia – objects appearing to shrink – are distortions in the 
subjective experiencing of reality that are often so convincing that an individual 
may begin to panic and feel as if he or she is losing touch with reality entirely 
(Simeon & Abugel, 2006). In the context of these many varied symptoms and the 
aforementioned criteria for diagnosis, one might wish to elucidate the prevalence 
of depersonalization disorder. 
 Surprisingly, depersonalization disorder is not as uncommon as one might 
imagine. In population-based community surveys as well as surveys of clinical 
(in-patient) and non-clinical samples, researchers have estimated that of the 
general population, from approximately one to two percent of individuals 
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currently fit the diagnostic criteria for depersonalization disorder (Hunter, Sierra, 
& David, 2004). Taken in context, this statistic is astonishing, seeing that roughly 
the same percentage of individuals from the general population currently fit the 
criteria for a diagnosis of obsessive-compulsive disorder, a much more widely 
known and studied pathology. The percentages of depersonalization disorder are 
found to increase to range from one to sixteen percent in psychiatric in-patient 
samples. Furthermore, over the course of the average individual’s lifetime, he or 
she has approximately a twenty-six to seventy-four percent chance of 
experiencing at least one episode of transient depersonalization and/or 
derealization. Finally, the experiencing of transient depersonalization and/or 
derealization during or after a traumatic event ranges in prevalence from thirty-
one to sixty-six percent (Hunter, Sierra, & David, 2004). What distinguishes these 
transient episodes of depersonalization and/or derealization from 
depersonalization disorder rests with the clinical criteria for diagnosis. Most 
notably, these episodes must cause marked distress and/or functional impairment 
in everyday life (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). 
 Continuing with the analysis, it is imperative to examine the high 
percentage of experiences of transient depersonalization and/or derealization 
during or after a traumatic event. Though the specific relationship between trauma 
and depersonalization has been largely unexamined, a study by one of the 
foremost researchers in the field has shown that childhood interpersonal trauma is 
highly predictive of depersonalization disorder. Simeon and colleagues (Simeon, 
Guralnik, Schmeidler, Sirof, & Knutelska, 2001) found that this childhood 
interpersonal trauma primarily takes the form of emotional abuse (rather than 
physical or sexual abuse) in the development of depersonalization disorder. These 
researchers define emotional abuse by breaking down the concept into five 
distinct categories: rejection/degradation, terror, exploitation/corruption, denial of 
emotional responsiveness, and isolation. Though interpersonal trauma can be seen 
as an antecedent to the development of pathological depersonalization and 
derealization symptoms, it is important to distinguish trauma as it relates to 
depersonalization disorder and trauma as it relates to the more commonly known 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 
 To be clear, a diagnosis of depersonalization disorder according to the 
DSM-IV-TR, unlike PTSD, does not require that the individual experienced a 
traumatic incident that has brought on the symptom profile in question. 
Furthermore, PTSD involves the persistent re-experiencing of the traumatic event 
in the form of flashback memories or nightmares, for example. Additionally, 
unlike depersonalization disorder, those suffering with PTSD typically experience 
a great psychological need to avoid places, people, or things that remind them of 
the traumatic event. PTSD also includes symptoms of hyper-arousal (increased 
startle response, hyper-vigilance, etc.) not characteristic of depersonalization 
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disorder. Finally, depersonalization disorder, even when directly associated with 
traumatic experience, does not usually result in the inability to remember all or 
part of the traumatic experience itself, a phenomenon notably present in PTSD 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). However, the two disorders can be 
seen as similar with respect to dissociative symptomatology. Depersonalization 
disorder hinges upon characteristic dissociative symptoms such as emotional 
numbing, subjective detachment from oneself and the world, and overall feelings 
of unreality. Emotional numbing in particular can also be seen in those suffering 
from PTSD (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). In addition to traumatic 
antecedents, research has also begun to uncover the biological nature and origins 
of depersonalization disorder.  
The research concerning the biology of depersonalization disorder is still 
in its infancy, much of it being pioneered by the American psychiatrist Daphne 
Simeon. Though the current research is slim, this in itself does not invalidate or in 
any way lessen the impact of the many discoveries that are continually advancing 
our understanding of depersonalization disorder and mental illness as a whole. To 
begin to understand the role of biology in depersonalization disorder, it has been 
seen that numerous brain regions are involved in the development of the disorder. 
One such region is the sensory cortex. The sensory cortex is responsible for 
making hierarchical perceptual associations in the brain. As incoming sensory 
information is initially received, the primary cortical areas gather and relay this 
information to secondary unimodal association areas. These areas serve to 
synthesize sensory information and relay it to cross-modal (or polymodal) 
association areas, the last stop in the perceptual association hierarchy. Cross-
modal association areas gather the synthesized sensory information to form what 
we might call “experience” – that is, subjective reality (Simeon & Abugel, 2006). 
Two areas of the brain that are essential in understanding the exceptionally 
common symptom of hypoemotionality in depersonalization disorder are the 
amygdala and the medial prefrontal cortex. The amygdala, a core component of 
the limbic system that serves as the basis for emotional responses in the brain, has 
been found to be underactive in those afflicted with depersonalization disorder 
(Simeon & Abugel, 2006). Due to this underactivation, numbness and lack of 
emotion inevitably result. Furthermore, the medial prefrontal cortex, responsible 
for dampening emotional responsiveness, is seen to be overactive in 
depersonalization disorder. With the underactivity of the amygdala and the 
overactivity of the medial prefrontal cortex, the limbic system and associated 
emotional responsiveness are severely inhibited (Simeon & Abugel, 2006). In 
addition to the brain regions previously mentioned, the insula, which serves to 
register internal bodily sensations, is underactive in depersonalization disorder, 
thus leading to an overall feeling of sensory dullness (Simeon & Abugel, 2006). 
Finally, a brain region important to the understanding of depersonalization 
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disorder is the hippocampus. The hippocampus, responsible for narrative (or 
concrete) memory encoding, fails to initially encode information. Though 
depersonalization does not inherently involve amnesia for traumatic events, 
abnormal encoding of memory (in the form of images versus a cohesive narrative, 
for example) still plays a role in the development of depersonalization disorder 
(Simeon & Abugel, 2006). Now that an essential understanding of the various 
brain regions involved in depersonalization disorder has been established, we can 
now turn to the question of the theoretical models of the biology of 
depersonalization. 
 One such theoretical model is the temporal lobe model of 
depersonalization. Researchers have found that after stimulating the temporal 
cortex, individuals have reported experiencing sensations of floating away and 
out-of-body experiences. It is hypothesized that these experiences as well as other 
symptoms of depersonalization disorder are the result of the abnormal “tagging” 
of incoming sensory information as unknown against existing memory templates. 
The resulting subjective experience is often a sense of strangeness, unfamiliarity, 
or overt unreality with reference to the self and/or the external world (Simeon & 
Abugel, 2006). 
 Another theoretical model of depersonalization is the cortico-limbic 
disconnection model. The essential component of this model is the lack of 
synchronicity between various regions of the brain. This model reflects the notion 
of the overactivity of the medial prefrontal cortex and the underactivity of the 
amygdala previously described. Depersonalization disorder is said to result in the 
event of the lack of synchronicity between the cortex – which is responsible for 
cognition and the dampening of emotions – and the limbic system – which is the 
emotional center of the brain (Simeon & Abugel, 2006). 
 One final theoretical model of depersonalization is the cortico-cortical 
disconnection model – the most wide-ranging and all-encompassing model of the 
three. The cortico-cortical disconnection model not only entails overall 
disconnections between regions of the cortex, but also involves cortico-limbic 
disconnection as well as what is known as thalamo-cortical disconnection (that is, 
abnormalities in the gating, relaying, and modulating of sensory information). It 
has been shown that disconnections between various areas of the cortex result 
from the blocking of the NMDA receptor, the receptor for the excitatory 
neurotransmitter glutamate which is usually responsible for the proper regulation 
of connections in the cortex (Simeon & Abugel, 2006). 
  Various neurological studies have shown an abnormal functioning of the 
sensory association cortex, which is responsible for processing sensory 
information and making necessary associations (Sierra & Berrios, 1998). 
Furthermore, brain-imaging studies including PET scans and fMRIs have been 
consistent with the theoretical models previously described. The overactivation of 
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the prefrontal cortex and the underactivation of the limbic system have been 
demonstrated in these brain-imaging studies as components of depersonalization 
disorder. In this sense, individuals are hypercognitive and hypoemotional – that is, 
they are cognitively aware that they should experience emotional responsiveness 
but they lack the ability to actually feel (Phillips et al., 2001; Simeon et al., 2000). 
Additionally, neurological studies examining the neurochemistry behind 
depersonalization have shown that various neurotransmitters could be involved in 
depersonalization.  
 Firstly, a possible serotonin component of depersonalization has been 
demonstrated. The hallucinogen and serotonin receptor agonist lysergic acid 
diethylamide (LSD) has been shown to trigger depersonalization symptoms in 
healthy individuals (Simeon & Abugel, 2006). Furthermore, meta-
chlorophenylpiperazine (mCPP), another serotonin receptor agonist, has induced 
episodes of transient depersonalization (Simeon et al., 1995). However, in the 
treatment of depersonalization disorder, it still remains to be established whether 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) are effective treatments. In 
addition to a possible serotonin involvement, it has been demonstrated that 
NMDA receptor antagonists – which serve to block glutamate at these receptors – 
such as ketamine (the “dissociative anesthetic”) as well as cannabinoids, 
hallucinogens, and opioids often induce states of depersonalization and/or 
derealization  (Simeon & Abugel, 2006). In addition to the neurochemistry of 
depersonalization, other studies have also validated the three theoretical models 
previously described. 
 Such studies have involved measurements of skin conductance – that is, 
the electrical properties of the skin – in response to various stimuli ranging from 
emotionally pleasant to neutral to unpleasant. Researchers have found a severely 
reduced skin conductance response to emotionally unpleasant stimuli in 
individuals suffering from depersonalization disorder. This goes to show the 
profound hypoemotionality inherent in the disorder. Also, researchers have found 
that these same individuals demonstrated an increased response to unexpected 
stimuli such as claps and other loud noises. It has accordingly been postulated that 
depersonalization serves the evolutionary function of increasing survival in 
situations of danger by simultaneously suppressing fear and increasing alertness 
(Sierra et al., 2002). 
 In conclusion, it is evident that depersonalization and derealization are 
relatively common dissociative phenomena whose etiological roots can be seen 
with reference to various biological and traumatic dissociative processes. It is 
imperative that an increased awareness of the existence, prevalence, and causes of 
depersonalization disorder should be established in order to foster in those 
suffering from the disorder a sense of community and societal acceptance. Future 
research should aim to build upon the current framework of knowledge relating to 
6
Colonial Academic Alliance Undergraduate Research Journal, Vol. 1 [2010], Art. 4
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/caaurj/vol1/iss1/4
depersonalization disorder and to endeavor to enhance effective treatment options 
for those suffering with the disorder. 
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